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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GAIL C. VAN TASSELL, and
AFTON VAN TASSELL,
Plaintiffs/Respondents
Case No. 20334
v.
ELWOOD C. SHAFFER,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS/RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether §78-12-35, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as

amended, provides for the tolling of a statute of limitations for
every absence of defendant from the State of Utah regardless of
the availability of alternative methods of service under Rule
4(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

Whether the trial court correctly applied §68-3-7,

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in deciding that the first
day of absence would be excluded and the last day of absence
would be included.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about November 19, 1973, the Fourth Judicial
District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah, in the
matter of Kamas State Bank v. Gail C. Van Tassell, Charles 0.
Shaffer

and

Elwood

C.

Shaffer, entered

a

judgment
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for

the

plaintiff and against the defendants in the amount of $33,162.12.
(R.104)
On December 3, 1973, said court, in the same civil
action, entered judgment as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by the reason
of the premises aforesaid, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.
That Gail C. Van Tassell have and recover
from Elwood C. Shaffer a judgment for any and all
sums paid by Gail C. Van Tassell to the plaintiff,
Kamas State Bank, on the deficiency judgment of
$33,162.12 entered herein by Kamas State Bank,
together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum
for any and all payments made on the judgment
until reimbursed by Elwood C. Shaffer.
2.
That Gail C. Van Tassell have and recover
from the defendant, Elwood C. Shaffer, a judgment
in the sum of $17,889.00, together with interest
at the rate of 8% per annum from the date hereof
until paid, together with Van Tassell!s costs and
disbursements in this action amounting to the sum
of $105.00." (R.104)
Thereafter, on February 1, 1974, the Kamas State Bank
duly executed an assignment of judgment to Afton Van Tassell,
wife of Gail C. Van Tassell, on the judgment entered on November
19, 1973.

(R.105)
This action was commenced on February 5, 1982, for the

renewal of the two judgments entered in November and December,
1973.(R.105)
The
§68-3-7,

Utah

trial
Code

court

in

Annotated,

the

instant

1953,

as

matter,
amended,

applying
that

the

defendant, Elwood C. Shaffer, was absent from, and outside the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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boundaries of the State of Utah for a period of 96 days*

(R.106,

107)
Plaintiffs

filed

a

motion

for

summary

judgment

(R.25-26) which was heard before the Honorable Judith Billings on
May 26, 1983.

Judge Billings ruled that all times when the

defendant was out of the State of Utah, after entry of 1973
judgments, tolled the statute of limitation and was not a part of
the period of time provided for before the commencement of an
action upon said judgments.

(R.90-91 & 99)

The trial court further ruled that the day on which
defendant left the State of Utah would not be included in the
time of his absence and that the day on which he returned would
be included.

(R.106-107)

After a trial on the merits, the court found that
defendant was absent from the State of Utah for a total of 96
days which was sufficient time to toll the statute of limitations
and made plaintiffs1 filing timely.

(R.107)

The court further found that the amount due and owing
on the judgment assigned to Afton Van Tassell is $61,681.44 and,
the amount due and owing on the judgment of December 3, 1973, to
Gail C. Van Tassell is $33,273.54, together with court costs in
that action of $105.00.

(R.107-110)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Absence from the State of Utah within the meaning of
§78-12-35, Utah

Code Annotated,

1953, as amended, means the

physical absence of the defendant
Supreme

Court has

long

subscribed

from the state.
to

the general

The Utah
rule that

despite the availability of alternative methods of service, the
statute of limitations is tolled by defendant's absence from this
state.

The Utah Supreme Court has steadfastly subscribed to this

rule irrespective of the fact that during defendant's absence
from the state of Utah, an actioBLj?.Q.uld have been commenced by
serving his wife at the family residence.

Defendant, in the

present case, was absent from this state for a period of 96 days.
Therefore, the trial court properly held that for said 96 days
the statute of limitations was tolled, and that plaintiffs filed
this action timely.
The trial court properly applied
Annotated, 1953, as amended.

According

§68-3-7, Utah Code

to that section, the

first day of defendant's absence from this state was excluded and
the last day of defendant's absence was included.

The trial

courts findings regarding defendant's absence from this state
were supported by substantial evidence, and therefore, must not
be disturbed on this appeal.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S ABSENCE FROM THE STATE TOLLED THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND, THEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS1
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT WAS TIMELY FILED.
Utah

Code

Annotated,

§78-12-35,

1953, as

amended,

provides as follows:

"If when a cause of action accrues against a
person when he is out of the state, the action may
be commenced within the term herein limited after
his return to the state; and if after a cause of
action accrues he departs from the state, the time
of his absence is not part of the time limited for
the commencement of the action."
This court was first called upon in the case of Lawson
v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P. 520 (1908), to apply a former Utah
statute, §2888, which was identical to the current statute.

In

the Lawson case, which involved a breach of contract, this court
stated as follows:
"While a general rule is that statutes of limitation generally are to be liberally construed, it
is also a well-recognized doctrine that, when such
statutes contain provisions excepting certain
persons or classes from the operation of the
statutes, those exceptions are to be strictly
construed. And courts will not by construction
extend the exception so as to include persons not
expressly mentioned therein." Id. at 522.
In the case of Keith O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah
227,

169

P.

954,

(Utah

1917),

this

court

again

held

that

defendant's absence from the state of Utah tolls the statute of
limitations.

The

Supreme

Court

affirmed

the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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trial

court,

notwithstanding

the fact that defendant's family continued to

live in this state.

The court stated:

It is, however, conceded that the
defendant's family, consisting of his wife and
minor children, continued to live in this state
during all of the time that the defendant was out
of the state and absent therefrom.
It is
contended that under our statute (Comp. Laws 1907,
§2948, Subd. 8) an action could have been
commenced against the defendant at any time by
serving process on defendant's wife at the family
residence or place of abode. The question, what
effect shall be given to the provisions of section
2888, supra, is therefore squarely presented.
Defendant's counsel contends that the provisions
of that section apply only to cases where neither
the debtor nor his family have a place of abode or
residence within the state so that process cannot
be served, and that where, as in this case, process can be served at the place of abode of his
family, and thus an action can be commenced at any
time, the running of the statute is not arrested
by reason of the defendant's absence from the
state.
The cases cited from Iowa, Nebraska,
Connecticut, and California are all based on
statutes which, in legal effect, are like our
section 2888, supra, which we have quoted in full.
Notwithstanding the language of those statutes,
however, it was held in those cases that mere
absence from the state in the case the debtor
could be served with process within the state
would not arrest the running of the statute of
limitations. The cases cited from Massachusetts,
Mississippi, New Hampshire and Vermont are,
however, based upon statutes that are quite
different from ours. In Massachusetts the statute
is arrested only in case the debtor is 'absent
from and resides out of the state.' . . . Under
all
of
the
foregoing
statutes, therefore,
nonresidence of as well as absence from the state
is necessary to toll the running of the statute.
. . . Upon the other hand there are a large number
of cases emanating from states where a statute
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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like ours is in force in which it is held that the
full time that the debtor is out of the state and
absent therefrom must be excluded in computing the
time, and that such is the case notwithstanding
the fact that the debtor's family may have a
residence or place of abode in the state, and that
service of process could be made upon some member
of the debtor's family at its residence or place
of abode"]
Our statute is an exact transcript from the
California statute, and in the case of Rogers v.
Hatch, (44 CAL. 280), the rule applicable to the
facts in the case at bar is stated in the
following words:
f

If, when the cause of action here accrues,
the person against whom the same exists
resides in the state, and he afterwards
departs
from the state, his successive
absences from the state must be aggregated
together and deducted from the whole time
which has elapsed since the cause of action
accrued, and the balance is the time the
statute of limitations has run.111
This general rule was affirmed by this court in Buell
v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 231 P. 123, (Utah 1924).

In that

case the defendant unsuccessfully argued that his absence from
the state should not toll the statute of limitation because he in
fact maintained "a residence in the state, with persons residing
there upon whom service of process might be made, prevented the
tolling

of

determined

the
by

appellant."

statute.
this

court

That

particular

adversely

to

question
the

contention

Keith 0fBrien Co., supra; Buell, supra.
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has been
of

In a later case, Gass v. Hunting, 561 P.2d 1071 (Utah
1977) , the general rule was affirmed.

The Utah Supreme Court in

that case clearly and distinctly stated the rule as follows:
"The statute and case quoted above seemed clear.
A suit on a judgment may be commenced during the
eight-year period following the entry thereof, and
the debtor's absence from state tolls the
eight-year period."
Applying the reasoning behind the above-cited cases to
the facts of the present case, it is evident that the trial
courtfs ruling must be affirmed.
expressed

The Utah State Legislature has

the will of the people by enacting

§78-12-35.

In

accordance therewith, the Supreme Court has held that "an absence
from the state tolls the eight-year period11.

Gass, supra, at

1072.
It is undisputed that the defendant "absented himself
from the state of Utah" for a period of 96 days.
Since

such

time

is

not

part

of

the

time

(R. 106-107)

limited

for

the

commencement of the instant action, which was filed on February
5, 1982, (R.105) it is well within the limits provided for in
said section.
Despite the clear and unambiguous language of §78-12-35
and the decisions of this court, defendant, in his brief, at
pages 6 through 10, boldly seeks to overrule the cases cited
herein and change the rule to which this court has subscribed
since 1908.

Specifically, the defendant is urging this.court to
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amend §78-12-35 by inserting an exception into that section which
the state legislature has declined to insert.

To support his

argument, defendant is relying upon Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d,
254, at 390 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964).
In

Snyder, this

court

found

that

the

non-resident

motorist was not absent from the state, so as to toll the statute
of limitations, because he had an agent authorized by law to
receive service of process.

The Snyder case, unlike the present

case, involved the applicability of a special statute, §41-12-8,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The

court,

however,

concerned with preserving

in

that

"the policy

case

of

was

primarily

law of allowing a

reasonable time for the bringing of an action, but of providing a
definite limitation of time in which it must be brought or the
matter put at rest."

Id. at 916.

The court further expressed a

concern that to accept plaintiff's argument with respect to the
interpretation

and application of §78-12-35 would permit the

commencement of an action "10, 20 or any number of years" after
the accrual of the cause of action.

Id.

It is hereby submitted that these concerns do not exist
in the instant case.

Arguably, had the Utah Supreme Court ruled

that the statute of limitations is tolled while a non-resident
motorist is absent from the state, an action involving such
motorist could be suspended indefinitely.

Assuming, for.the sake
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of argument, that plaintiffs in this case had waited 96 more days
before filing this action, and that defendant was within the
state during such time; then plaintiffs1 action would have been
barred by §78-12-22.
In other words, this action is governed by a definite
limitation of time in which it must be filed or it will be put to
rest.

It is that "definite limitation11 which concerned the court

in the Snyder case.
Defendantfs
availed

themselves

argument

of

the

that

plaintiffs

alternative

method

should
of

have

service

of

process pursuant to Rule 4(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
must be rejected.

The election of which method of service to

utilize must be made by the plaintiffs.

It is not within the

province of defendant, nor the court, to dictate which method of
service

of

process

plaintiffs

should

elect.

It

is

further

submitted that accepting defendant's argument would inject a sour
note into, and would not harmonize with, the policy of law of
allowing a reasonable but definite limitation of time in which to
file an action.
Section

Snyder, supra, at 916.
78-12-35,

Utah

Code

Annotated,

1953,

as

amended, was transcribed verbatim from the California Code of
Civil Procedure, §351-

Therefore, decisions by the California

Supreme Court regarding these issues must be afforded significant
consideration by this court in resolving this matter.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In Dew v. Appleberry, 591 P.2d 509, (Cal. 1979), a tort
action, the California Supreme Court held as follows:
"We find no irreconcilable conflict between §351
and the statutes governing substitute service.
The Legislature may have justifiably concluded
that defendant's physical absence impedes his
availability for suit, and that it would be
inequitable to force a claimant to pursue the
defendant out of this state in order effectively
to commence an action within the limitations. At
the same time, by providing alternative forms of
service, the Legislature simply encourages a
plaintiff to adjudicate his claim expeditiously if
possible; by using substitute service, a plaintiff
may now obtain a binding judgment even in the
defendant's absence. While the alternate service
provision may lessen the need for §351, we do not
believe that a repealed §351 pro tanto.11 Id., at
513.
Other jurisdictions have also concluded that a statute
of limitations is subject to tolling statutes during the time
defendant

was

absent

from

the particular

Wetzel v. Weyant, 323 N.E. 2d 711, (Ohio

jurisdiction.
1975),

See

Dicker v.

Brinkley, 555 S.W. 495 (Tex. 1977); Loomis v. Skillerns-Loomis
Plaza, Inc. 593 S.W. 2d 409 (Tex. 1980); Travis v. McGlaughlin,
224 S.E. 2d 243 (M.C. 1976); and 55 A.L.R. 3d 1158, §4 (a).
Though defendant did not abscond from the state of Utah
to avoid service of process, he was, however, absent from the
state for 96 days.

(R.106-107).

In calculating the time within

which plaintiffs had to commence this action, credit must be
given for said 96 days.
court did.

And, that is exactly what the trial

Affording defendant the relief he prays for upon this
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appeal is contrary to the general rule to which this court has
long subscribed.
Defendant's only concrete support for his position is
the Snyder case.

However, the cursory comparison of that case

with the instant matter reveals one obvious difference, i.e., the
special non-resident statute.
the

instant

case.

That statute has no application to

Furthermore,

a more

thorough

reading

of

Snyder, supra, reveals that, in that case, the Utah Supreme Court
was concerned about the possibility that a purported claim may be
preserved indefinitely after its origin; which
with neither reason nor justice".

!t

would not comport

Snyder, supra, at 916.

The

threat of the everlasting claim, strikes discord into the general
policy of law to have all claims brought within reasonable but
definite time.

That is why the Snyder decision was proper under

the given circumstances.
the

present

are

However, the circumstances surrounding

distinctly

different;

and,

therefore,

the

reasoning of Snyder must be limited to the facts of that case,
must not be extended to all civil matters.
Defendant

laments

about

the

plaintiffs'

formal

discovery to ascertain, among other things, information regarding
defendant's absence from the State of Utah.
page 10.)

(Defendant's brief,

The sum and substance of this charge is that the

statute of limitations should be judicially amended to protect
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defendant

from having

to comply with the formal demands for

discovery in accordance with the general rules of discovery.
If a party to an action abuses the discovery process,
then the courts can, and should, issue appropriate orders to
redress

the abused

Procedure.

party.

Rule

26(c),

Utah Rules of Civil

Such orders cannot be so expansive as to amend a

valid statute, such as §78-12-35, just to appease a party who is
unhappy about having to comply with proper demands for discovery.
POINT II
THE UTAH CODE CONTAINS A PROVISION THAT THE TIME
IN WHICH ANY ACT PROVIDED BY LAW IS TO BE DONE IS
COMPUTED IN DAYS.
§68-3-7,

Utah

Code

Annotated,

1953,

as

amended,

provides as follows:
"The time in which any act provided by law is to
be done is computed by excluding the first day and
including the last day, unless the last is a
holiday and then it is also excluded."
The

trial

court,

in

computing

the

days

on

which

defendant was outside of the state of Utah, excluded the first
day and included the last day.

(R.106)

This computation led the

trial court to conclude that from December 3, 1973, through
December 3, 1982, defendant was outside of this state for a
period of 96 days.

(R.107)

In Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469 (1981), this court was
asked to decide, among other things, whether an execution sale
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took place within the prescribed

time limitation.

The court

stated:
"The method of computing time periods relating to
acts provided for by law is set out in .
§68-3-7 • . . When the time period is measured in
months or years from a certain date, the day from
which the time is to run is excluded and the same
calendar date of the final month or year is
included." Id. at 471.
The language of §68-3-7 is clear and unambiguous, and
has been literally applied by the Supreme Court.

Regardless of

how the time periods are measured, the first day is excluded and
the last day is included.

For example, if a defendant is out of

the state for 30 days, the first day will not be be included in
computing

the time such defendant

is absent from the state.

Whereas the last day will be included in such computation.

In

other words, such a defendant, for the purpose of tolling the
statute of limitation, would have been outside the state for 29
days.
Based
amended,

and

upon
the

§68-3-7,
Supreme

Utah

Code Annotated,

Court's

computation of time, it is submitted

decision

1953, as

regarding

the

that the trial court's

decision must be upheld, and the defendant's argument upon this
appeal must be rejected.
It has long been recognized by this court that a trial
court's findings and conclusions, if supported by substantial
evidence, will not be disturbed upon appeal.

Sine v. Salt Lake

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Transportation Co,, 106 Utah 289, 147 P.2d 875-879, (1944).

In a

more recent case, Sharpe v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 671
P.2d 185 (1983), this court stated the standard of review to be
utilized on appeals is as follows:
"In reviewing the findings and judgments of a
trial court, after the trial on the merits, this
court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, and judgment
will be affirmed with the findings of fact are
substantiated by the evidence." Id. at 187.
See also Sohm v. Winegar, 565 P.2d 1134 (1977), where
this court viewed the findings and judgment in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party; and, First Western Fidelity v.
Gibbons & Reed Co. , 27 Utah 2d, 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971), where
this court held that it must survey the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court's findings.
Applying the usual standard for review to the instant
case,

it is hereby

submitted

that when

surveying

the trial

court's findings, with respect to the number of days defendant
was absent from the State of Utah, in the light most favorable to
plaintiffs, it is clear that said findings and judgment were
supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, must not be
disturbed.
CONCLUSION
This court has long adhered to the general rule that
the

statute

of

limitations

is

tolled when

physically absent from the state of Utah.

the defendant is
Defendant is now
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urging this court to overrule decisions and cases upon which this
court has stood since 1908.
The

case

upon

which

defendant

is

supporting

his

argument is Snyder v. Clune, supra, a case which is factually
distinguishable from the instant case, and, more importantly, a
case in which this court addressed concerns that are not a part
of the instant case.
§78-12-35, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, is
written in plain and unambiguous language and provides that "the
time of (defendant's) absence (from the state) is not part of the
time limited for the commencement of the action."

The defendant

is urging this court to act as a judicial legislature and amend
said section.

To amend a statute is a legislative power which is

beyond the control of the judiciary.

If the state legislature,

when it enacted the sections in question, had desired to adopt
the rule proposed by the defendant, then it could have done so;
but it did not.

Defendant should turn to the State Legislature,

and not to this court, for the relief he seeks upon this appeal.
The defendant was not available for service of process
for 96 days throughout the eight years following the entry of
judgments

for plaintiffs.

Taking

into account

such absence,

plaintiffs' instant action to reaffirm said judgments was timely
filed, and was not barred by the statute of limitations.
judgment of the trial court must, therefore, be affirmed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The

The trial court properly ruled to exclude the first and
include the last day in computing the actual days defendant was
physically absent from the state.
with the mandate of §68-3-6.

This ruling is in accordance

Hence, the trial court's findings,

based upon said ruling, must also be affirmed.
Dated this ^$L

day of October, 1985.
Respectfully submitted,
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